In this paper I argue that politicians' time horizons affect the differing levels of state intervention against AIDS. Using data measuring government spending, AIDS policy, and political constraints, I test the presumption that the leader of a country can determine a country's level of AIDS intervention. I look at countries in east and southern Africa to explore the relationship between political institutions that constrain an executive's time horizon (i.e. competitive elections) and the level of the state's efforts in the fight against AIDS. My primary hypothesis is that an executive with a shorter time horizon is less likely to create policy or devote resources to intervene against AIDS. I find that lengthening an executive's time horizon increases the level of government spending on health, but that executives with shorter time horizons tended to have more comprehensive AIDS policy than their counterparts with longer time horizons.
Introduction
President Yoweri Museveni's work against HIV is often hailed as a successful response to the HIV epidemic in Uganda. Conversely, former South African President Thabo Mbeki's inaction against HIV in South Africa is often chastised and sometimes blamed for the rising rates of HIV in his country. Though the two leaders are commonly referenced in the characterization of good and bad responses to AIDS, respectively, I question whether a different person faced with the same AIDS epidemic operating under the same institutional constraints on political leadership would pursue a different path.
I argue that a politician's time horizon affects the level of state intervention against AIDS. I employ a simplified rational actor framework where the central actor is the political leader of the country. My model considers a ruler's motivations given institutional constraints in predicting whether and in what amounts he will create policies and allocate state resources to intervene against AIDS. Because of the relatively long latent phase from HIV infection to AIDS disease, my central hypothesis is that an executive with a shorter time horizon is less likely to create policy or devote resources to intervene against AIDS. Essentially, I posit that the negative effects of AIDS are a long-term consequence, and any ruler who does not expect to be in power in the long term will not address the problem. I find that executive time horizons affect level of state intervention against AIDS, but not exactly as hypothesized. Though lengthening an executive's time horizon increases the level of government spending on health, executives with shorter time horizons tended to have more comprehensive AIDS policy and planning than their counterparts. I surmise that executives who expect to be around when AIDS problems emerge will address the problem substantively, but those with short time horizons will channel spending to other efforts in order to maximize the chance of staying in office. Executives with short time horizons devote less government spending to public health than their counterparts with longer time horizons, but create more AIDS policy, an action that is cheap -whereas actually implementing policy is expensive -and that may generate some short-term benefits, mostly in the form of monetary assistance from international actors. To explore the relationship between time horizons and state HIV intervention, I look at countries in east and southern Africa, where AIDS has reached pandemic proportions.
A Theory of Executive Time Horizons

Time Horizons and Policy Choice
Rulers are at the head of the institutions that determine and implement state policies (Levi, 1988) .
As such, the ruler is central to my analysis. 1 The general question this paper asks is: why do political leaders respond differently to a similar problem? An investigation of a politician's motivations, preferences, and the system of constraints in which he operates can inform researchers as to why countries experience different policy outcomes. Politicians are motivated to pursue policies that insure first and foremost their political survival (Nordhaus, 1975; Mayhew, 1974; Levi, 1988; Geddes, 1994; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007) .
Executive time horizons are crucial to a political leader's incentive structure (Clague et al., 1996) . Political decision makers who expect to remain in power longer are less likely to take actions that incur short-run benefits at the expense of larger long term costs (Keefer, 1999) .
Both democrats and autocrats face constraints on office tenure. Democratically elected leaders, at least theoretically, face a consistently timed possibility of losing office with the institution of regular elections. Nordhaus (1975) modeled a government's behavior when constrained by regular elections: choices motivated by a politician's desire to be in office may not be in concert with providing a long-term public good, as the electorate has a short memory.
Even authoritarian rulers face constraints, sometimes from legislatures (Levi, 1988; North and Weingast, 1989; Wright, 2008a) , or from the threat of revolt Przeworski, 2006, 2007) and are therefore not entirely free from addressing their country's issues. Authoritarian rulers will choose either to invest in the public or insure their own situation post-rule based on their time horizons (Wright, 2008b) .
Executives with a stronger hold on power should have a longer horizon than other executives (Beck et al., 2001) . I expect that in countries with democratic elections, political leaders who won by narrow margins will be more short-sighted than political leaders winning by larger margins.
Politicians with narrow victories have reason to be more preoccupied with ensuring their political survival because they have a smaller support base in the electorate. Leaders with more popular support or weak opposition have a longer horizon (Beck et al., 2001) . As stated previously, authoritarian rulers, though not usually subject to the threat of electoral defeat, cannot completely ignore the needs of their citizenry -or at least the needs of those who have sufficient power to challenge their authority. In this paper, I test the idea that rulers worried of an impending ousting from power would not devote resources to a policy program lacking in short-term benefits. Despite the fatal outcome of AIDS, cross-national survey data show that Africans fail to prioritize HIV/AIDS (Afrobarometer, 2004 ) and public opinion is mixed about whether to allocate resources to AIDS programs (Dionne, 2009) . HIV/AIDS programs fail to be a priority even among those most affected by AIDS in Africa: be they respondents in the cross-national
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Afrobarometer survey who have lost a close friend or relative to AIDS, or HIV-positive respondents in rural Malawi (Dionne 2009; Dionne, Gerland and Watkins, 2009 (Morgan et al., 2002) . If a political leader fails to intervene, however, HIV could devastate a nation's population, economy, and, some scholars argue, state capacity (Price-Smith, 2002; Ostergard, 2002; de Waal, 2003) . Even rulers not personally affected by the disease would be motivated to pursue policy in an effort to avoid the negative long-term effects of AIDS on a country. Furthermore, from a budgetary perspective, it is far less costly to prevent HIV infection than to treat people with AIDS (World Bank, 1997), making early intervention more attractive to those who expect to witness in office the long-term impact of AIDS.
Responding to AIDS requires proactive political leaders who recognize the possible risk of not addressing the AIDS epidemic and who are willing to invest resources in HIV and AIDS intervention programs. Even if a politician were to make radical changes that impacted the course of the epidemic, it would take time for the change to work its way through the population to the point that anyone would see the results. Essentially, a leader must pay for HIV programs upfront, assume the risk of having little if any return on that investment, all while the general population makes little expressed demand for AIDS policy. Rather, the public is demanding other goods and services, and given budget constraints, when a leader spends public money on AIDS programs and policies, he effectively reduces the amount he can spend on other goods and services demanded by his constituents.
I argue that politicians constrained by a short time horizon will seek policies focused on short-term outcomes. For example, in democracies with an upcoming competitive election, I
would expect the executive to create policies that distribute short-term benefits to the electorate in order to get re-elected. Similarly, an authoritarian ruler worried about an impending removal from office would also institute policies aimed at maintaining office. Such situations would work against dealing effectively with problems like AIDS that require a longer-term commitment.
Hence, I expect short executive time horizons to have a negative impact on the level of state AIDS intervention. Thus, the central hypothesis to be tested in this paper is: H2: Authoritarian executives who have a high probability of being ousted from office in the near term will intervene less against AIDS compared to authoritarian executives with a low probability of being ousted.
Context, Data and Methods
Context: East and Southern Africa
Although only 10% of the world's population lives in sub-Saharan Africa, it is home to 68% of the people living with HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS, 2008) . Limiting the scope of research to countries in east and southern Africa, the proportions of a population infected with HIV in 2003 vary from 3.9% in Angola to 37.3% in Botswana (UNAIDS, 2004) . Using a score from the AIDS Program Effort Index (API) as a measure of state efforts in HIV policy and planning, there is evidence that the levels of national intervention also vary (USAID et al., 2003) . The API's policy and planning score is highest for countries with more comprehensive strategic plans to combat HIV and lower for countries with less comprehensive plans or which lack policies/plans altogether. 
Explanatory variables: Time horizons in authoritarian and democratic regimes
The measure of executive time horizon is dependent on regime type: in authoritarian regimes, I
use the probability of regime failure and in democracies I use margin of electoral victory. 16 To approximate executive time horizons in authoritarian countries, I use data from Geddes (1999) and updated by Wright (2008a) that estimates a probability for failure of regime, which is the predicted value of a duration model. 17 I assume leaders with a lower probability of regime failure will have longer time horizons and I recode the probability of regime failure variable such that low values of probability of failure are high values of authoritarian executive time horizon, and conversely, high values of probability of regime failure translate into shorter expected time horizons.
To measure the expected time horizon of leaders in the remaining, more democratic countries, I use the margin of victory won by the executive against his leading opposition candidate in the most recent election prior to 2001. Leaders with a larger margin of victory are assumed to have longer time horizons, whereas leaders with a narrow electoral victory will be more concerned with the short-term demands of the electorate as they seek to remain in power.
Long-term problems like AIDS are expected to rank as lower priority to leaders who will soon be faced with a competitive election. Both time horizons measures are scaled from 0 to 1. Higher values on the measures of executive time horizons indicate longer time horizons. Summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis are provided in Table 2.   [table 2 Likewise, those countries with an observation for authoritarian time horizon were coded "0" on democratic time horizon. I created a dummy variable, to estimate the mean shifts between these two groups of countries. The authoritarian dummy variable is coded "1" for those countries with data for authoritarian time horizon and coded "0" for those countries with data for democratic time horizon. 
Effects of Supply and Demand (Control Variables)
The effect of "supply" on state AIDS intervention is unproven. The lack of statistical significance in all but one model tested here shows that logged GDP per capita has no apparent effect on level of HIV intervention. Countries with higher GDP per capita were expected to have more resources to devote to HIV intervention, however, given the lack of statistical significance it is difficult to determine whether GDP per capita has a positive or negative effect on AIDS intervention.
The log of HIV prevalence achieves statistical significance in only one of the models tested.
All models demonstrate a positive relationship between demand for HIV intervention and level of HIV intervention. For example, increasing logged prevalence of HIV by one standard deviation would increase an API policy and planning score by 6.8 points (roughly two-thirds of a standard deviation). Though the logic of the "supply and demand" argument seemed straightforward, the real effect either GDP per capita or HIV prevalence has on HIV intervention is not strongly supported by the analysis here.
Effects of Executive Time Horizons
Figures 1 [figures 1-6 here]
The small sample size inhibits a definitive conclusion on the importance of executive time horizons for state AIDS intervention. The executive time horizon measure based on margin of electoral victory, in particular, fails to achieve statistical significance in both models used in regressions against government expenditures. The lack of statistical significance could be attributed to small sample size, but could also mean the time horizon of democratic executives has no effect on health spending. The effects of the time horizon of democratic executives on the API policy and planning score are opposite of the expected (positive) sign: the regressions estimate the shorter a democratic executive's horizon based on margin of electoral victory, the higher API policy and planning score his country will achieve. For example, increasing the time The measure of authoritarian executive time horizons was more robust in the regressions. As predicted, it has a positive relationship with government health expenditures; increasing an authoritarian's time horizon by one standard deviation (0.05) increases the amount a government spends on health by 3.2 percentage points. This finding confirms Hypothesis 2 that executives with longer time horizons based on lower probability of regime failure will likely spend more on health. Like the time horizon measure based on margin of electoral victory, however, the regressions of the time horizon measure based on probability of authoritarian regime failure against the API policy and planning score were also the opposite of the predicted (positive) sign.
Though I expected increasing an authoritarian's time horizon would increase the likelihood that a government would create policy for AIDS intervention, the evidence shows the opposite.
The effects of executive time horizons on level of AIDS intervention behaved differently based on the outcome measure. As expected, increasing an executive's time horizon increased the level of government expenditures on health. Essentially, executives not expecting to be in office for very long would spend less government money on health. In the case of policymaking, however, the opposite is seen in the data. Executives with short time horizons had more comprehensive AIDS policy and planning than did their counterparts with longer time horizons.
While unexpected, the dichotomy between the effects on these two different measures is reasonable. It is cheaper and easier to make policy than it is to actually implement the reform dictated by the policy. Executives with short time horizons looking for a cheap, quick fix can create national AIDS commissions and craft AIDS policy in an effort to gain more support at home and internationally. However, actually spending government money to implement those policies would only happen in those countries where the executive has a longer time horizon.
Most disappointing is the inability to infer any effect executive time horizons have on domestic AIDS spending: the coefficient estimates for executive time horizons, though positive, have very large standard errors and thus fail to achieve statistical significance.
Discussion and Conclusion
Most scholarly work on HIV and AIDS focuses on the effects of epidemiological, economic or cultural factors on HIV prevalence; only recently have scholars begun to study political responses to the AIDS pandemic (Lieberman, 2009 (Lieberman, , 2007 Gauri and Lieberman, 2006; Patterson, 2005 Patterson, , 2006 Bor, 2007) . The effect of political leaders' efforts on HIV rates is still unproven, yet the study of state response to AIDS is relevant to international donors seeking compatible local governments for implementing HIV/AIDS interventions: although international donors have incredible resources with which to tackle the AIDS epidemic, they still require the access provided by local political leaders. Beyond policy implications, the study uncovers yet another useful application of the case study of AIDS policy in studying theories of political business cycles and executive time horizons. The paper has developed a theory of the importance of executive time horizons in the study of AIDS interventions. As such, it contributes to the general study of HIV/AIDS by utilizing a political framework. Similarly, the paper contributes to the political science literature in that it explores the context of a time-dependent public health problem in analyzing how constraints on the executive affect policy outcomes.
The analysis presented here is limited by a small sample, and though suggestive that time Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 6 In fact, without a generalized epidemic, one may not expect a national response in a resourcepoor setting. Therefore, little data is gathered on the AIDS policies/programs of countries without generalized epidemics.
7 HIV-2 is biologically similar to HIV-1, but has a reduced virulence compared to HIV-1 and is geographically limited to mainly West Africa (Marlink et al., 1994) . The difference in virulence of the two types of HIV leads to a different infection rate which leads to a different prevalence rate, and it would be expected, a different kind/level of response from the government.
